











eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Can one policy change help Los Angeles make 
room for thousands of additional housing 
units near transit and alleviate development 
pressure on current residential neighborhoods? 
One possibility: Repealing Proposition U. The measure, 
approved by LA voters in 1986, cut the  Floor Area 
Ratio (FAR) — the relationship between the lot size of a 
property and the amount of development permitted for 
that property — in half for most of the city’s commercial- 
and manufacturing-zoned land. It permanently and 
dramatically decreased the development potential of 
LA’s commercial corridors, and has gone down in history 
as a key driver of LA’s notoriously low-slung urban form 
(see Figure 1). 
We studied the impacts of Proposition U and found 
that the Height District-1 (HD-1) corridors it created 
have become home to current and future transit stops 
and a range of retail and cultural amenities, with no 
discernable effect on the property values of nearby
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homes. The corridors would be the foundation 
for walkable, transit-oriented, and mixed-use 
neighborhoods, and the creation of new space for 
housing that does not harm the equity of surrounding 
homeowners — that is, if housing could be built on top 
of retail. As a consequence of Proposition U, however, 
it cannot, and the full potential of these sites cannot be 
realized. 
The LA City Council has tried to get around FAR 
limitations with some success, including two 
new Residential Accessory Services (RAS) zoning 
designations that facilitate housing development with 
ground floor commercial space. RAS designations have 
restored residential potential to sites where Proposition 
U removed it and created an estimated 10,900 units 
between 2002 and 2010.1 But use of RAS zones is rare, 
constituting a tiny fraction of HD-1’s total land area. Thus, 
they hardly make up for the limited FAR imposed on 
the entire HD-1 by Proposition U, and are a patchwork 
solution to a problem that can only be solved by full 
repeal.
Before Prop U: 
FAR of 3 
After Prop U: 
FAR of 1.5
Figure 1. Illustrations of Floor Area Ratios
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ORIGINS OF 
PROPOSITION U
When voters were considering Proposition U, the Los 
Angeles Times urged a “No” vote on the measure, calling 
it “the most extensive one-shot effort to limit future 
development in the city’s history.” 2,3 So how did it 
manage to pass by a 2-1 margin?
Proposition U was born of a petition, “the initiative for 
reasonable limits on commercial buildings and traffic 
growth,” that landed on the 1986 general election 
ballot thanks to signatures primarily from the affluent 
homeowners of the San Fernando Valley and the 
Westside. “Anti-growth” community groups supported 
the measure, agitated by the traffic congestion they 
associated with the high-density commercial and 
office construction that often took place along major 
boulevards in hot real estate markets such as Westwood 
and the south Valley. Some scholars have characterized 
Proposition U as a handout to wealthy homeowners on 
the principle that zoning for lower residential densities 
tend to increase home values.4,5,6
The “pro-growth” contingency that opposed Proposition 
U included developers and labor leaders concerned that 
the initiative would prevent businesses from locating in 
LA.7 Notably, developers and business associations who 
opposed the downzoning did so on the basis that the 
value of their property would decrease. The Boulevard 
Business Association in Atwater Village stated in an 
opposition letter that the zoning changes would limit 
development and reduce the marketability of property on 
Glendale Boulevard.8 Both sides believed that tightening 
land use regulations would benefit homeowner property 
values while harming commercial values.  
To date this assumption has remained untested and the 
impact of Proposition U on land development has been 
hard to gauge. It came during a lull in the economy when 
the city was already seeing an overall drop in applications 
for construction permits.9 Additionally, historic parcel 
level research is difficult given the limited availability of 
point-of-sale transaction data.
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To estimate the property value impacts, we compared 
eight commercial retail corridors to two different control 
groups. First, we examined transactions that occurred in 
these corridors in a six-year period before the passage 
of Proposition U, compared to a control group of 
transactions from the six-year period after the measure 
passed. Then, a treatment group of transactions that 
occurred in the same eight corridors within LA were 
compared to a control group of transactions outside the 
city. Regression models tested for statistically significant 
differences in the trend in sales prices, before and 
after Proposition U as well as within LA compared to in 
adjacent jurisdictions.
The findings suggest that the value of each commercial 
parcel is lower due to diminished development 
potential. In the years immediately following the 
Proposition U downzone, commercial prices did not 
experience any broader increase due to scarcity of 
supply (Figure 2). As for residential property, prices 
continued to climb unabated after Proposition U (Figure 
3), but the trend line is too consistent to attribute any 
boost to the measure, and we conclude that it had no 
effect on residential property. 
In brief, commercial prices stagnated after Proposition U 
while residential prices were unaffected. Based on this 
analysis alone, the commercial price stagnation after 
1986 cannot be attributed exclusively to Proposition 
U. Confounding factors include the nature of historical 
controls, substantial data limitations, and the obscuring 
effect of the dramatic real estate market shifts in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.
Repealing Proposition U is a critical first step to 
increasing LA’s housing supply, as it would enable 
the construction of mixed-use development along 
commercial corridors. And if resident opposition to 
density on commercial corridors is based in beliefs 
about the impact of development on residential values, 
our study has demonstrated that those fears are 
unfounded. The only price impact of Proposition U was 
a reduction in commercial property values. Restoring 
the development potential of HD-1s would drive 
private investment to areas that have not yet attracted 
revitalization, and a repeal could initiate a surge of 
transit-oriented housing in walkable, amenity-rich 
neighborhoods. Further, by directing development to 
underutilized corridors with low housing inventories, a 
repeal would alleviate pressures on existing residential 
areas who wish to preserve community character.
CURRENT STUDY 
Recent research by UCLA students sought to finally 
determine whether Proposition U’s regulations 
depressed commercial values and boosted nearby 
home values as stakeholders at the time predicted.
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Figure 2. Commercial price per square foot over time Figure 3. New multifamily developments
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